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Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
Steve Schneider, Member, IEEE Computer Society
Abstract—This paper presents a general approach for analysis and verification of authentication properties using the theory of
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The paper aims to develop a specific theory appropriate to the analysis of
authentication protocols, built on top of the general CSP semantic framework. This approach aims to combine the ability to express
such protocols in a natural and precise way with the ability to reason formally about the properties they exhibit. The theory is
illustrated by an examination of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol. The protocol is first examined with respect to a single
run and then more generally with respect to multiple concurrent runs.
Index Terms—Authentication, security protocols, formal methods, CSP, verification, Needham-Schroeder protocol.
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1 INTRODUCTION
UTHENTICATION comes in a variety of forms, and
authentication protocols are used in a number of ways
depending on the precise security properties that they are
believed to provide. International standard ISO 7498-2 [8]
distinguishes two forms of authentication:
• peer entity authentication, which is intended to pro-
vide confidence in an entity’s identity at the time of
usage. This kind of authentication involves freshness,
but does not provide any guarantees about any data
transferred.
• data origin authentication, which provides corrobora-
tion of the source of a data unit.
Both of these forms of authentication are concerned with
the identification of an entity, in one case to associate it with
the current connection, and in the other case to associate it
with a message. Entities are often identified with posses-
sion of a particular secret password or key by agents acting
on their behalf, with protocols aiming to establish the fact
of such possession. The international standard ISO/IEC
9798-1 states that “an entity to be authenticated proves its
identity by showing its knowledge of a secret.” Data origin
authentication is commonly provided by encipherment or
by digital signature, but the essential property is that the
data could only have been generated by an entity in posses-
sion of particular secret information.
The question arises for any particular authentication
protocol as to which kind of authentication the protocol
was designed for, and which kinds it actually provides. A
framework for expressing different flavors of authentica-
tion property would help to address this issue. An example
of such a framework is the logic of authentication proposed
in [2], which provides a language for expressing different
security requirements. For example, the requirement that A
should know she is communicating with B is easily distin-
guished from the requirement that B should know that A
knows she is communicating with B.
Protocols are implemented in terms of messages, so the
correctness of an authentication must consider the relation-
ship between the messages of the protocol and the entities
whose authentication is required. The aim of the Commu-
nicating Sequential Processes (CSP) approach presented in
this paper is to describe precisely what a protocol is in-
tended to achieve in terms of its messages, and to provide a
framework for verifying claims about such properties. CSP
provides a language for formal description of protocols,
and a semantic theory for reasoning about their properties.
This approach forces the separation of properties and pro-
tocols, and allows discussion of what is meant by particular
kinds of security property independently of the protocols
that are intended to achieve them. The formal analysis will
then be entirely within the CSP framework which allows
the possibility of verification of protocols with respect to
the CSP properties.
The theoretical foundations of the CSP framework pro-
posed by this author are described in [22]. Since a CSP de-
scription of a protocol has a precisely defined semantics it is
a precise mathematical question as to whether the protocol
meets the property or not. However, the practicalities of
how such a verification might be carried out are not ad-
dressed. That is the purpose of this paper.
The approach taken here is firstly to express the protocol
in CSP. The authentication property we consider requires
that the receipt of some message of the protocol guarantees
that some earlier message must have been transmitted by the
required agent. If B executes a protocol run ostensibly with
A, then the final message B receives should provide some
guarantees concerning A’s participation. We establish this by
defining a suitable rank function on messages which shows
that only messages above a particular rank can circulate in a
restricted system in which A is blocked, and that this also
blocks B’s protocol run—the rank of B’s final message is too
low and the proof establishes that it cannot appear.
CSP is particularly suitable for describing protocols at a
level close to the level we think of them. In other contexts
the rank argument essentially amounts to an unreachabil-
ity analysis or a proof that a particular word is not in a
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language. The strength of this approach is that there is a
formal link between the rank arguments and a natural de-
scription of the protocol. Formalization of the protocol into
CSP also exposes issues and forces design decisions that
may not have been explicit in the original abstract protocol
description. The Formalization of the required authentica-
tion property likewise forces consideration of what, pre-
cisely, is meant by authentication. It is useful to know
which precise (CSP) properties the protocol does indeed
guarantee, and which it does not. Both peer entity authenti-
cation and data origin authentication properties can be
specified within this approach.
One of the strengths of CSP is the ease with which spe-
cialized theories can be constructed on top of the semantic
models. This allows particular specification statements to
be defined in terms of the standard semantics, and new
proof rules appropriate to these specifications to be pro-
vided. This approach is taken here, where we specify and
reason about authentication properties, and about agents’
inability to generate particular messages. Although stan-
dard proof rules would support the verification (since they
are sound and complete), it is preferable to develop a spe-
cialized theory since it provides an appropriate level of ab-
straction for supporting the kind of reasoning we require.
The protocol to be analyzed in this paper is a slimmed
down and amended version of the Needham-Schroeder
public-key protocol [16], in which the public keys of A and
B are already known to each other. The original form of this
protocol has been the subject of an attack in [10], where
Lowe suggests an amendment to the protocol intended to
make it secure. The full version also involves communica-
tion between each party and a trusted server to obtain the
public keys. The cut down version of the original protocol
may be described as follows:
A  B    :    pB(nA.A)
  B  A    :    pA(nA.nB)
                                    A  B    :    pB(nB)
This protocol may be informally understood as follows: A
invents a new message or nonce nA, appends her identity A,
encrypts the result with B’s public key, and sends it to B.
User B is able to decrypt the message and obtain the nonce
nA. He sends it back to A, together with his own newly in-
vented nonce nB, all encrypted with A’s public key. A de-
crypts this response, and responds by sending B’s nonce
back. The intention is that at the end, A and B have each
authenticated their identity to the other.
Lowe’s attack describes a scenario in which user A’s le-
gitimate initiation of the protocol with I is used to initiate a
protocol run with B where B acts as if the other partner is A:
     A  I    :    pI(nA.A)
I(A)  B    :    pB(nA.A)
B  I(A)    :    pA(nA.nB)
     I  A    :    pA(nA.nB)
     A  I    :    pI(nB)
I(A)  B    :    pB(nB)
Here I(A) denotes agent I impersonating A, either generat-
ing a message that appears to B to have come from A, or
intercepting a message addressed to A. The end result of
this interchange of messages is that A believes she has es-
tablished a session with I, and B believes he has established
a session with A.
Lowe suggests an amendment to the protocol, requir-
ing that the second message contains the responder’s
identity explicitly. The amended version, which will be
used as the running example throughout this paper, is
described as follows:
A  B    :    pB(nA.A)
      B  A    :    pA(nA.nB.B)
      A  B    :    pB(nB)
This amendment foils the attack above, but the question
arises as to whether it is open to other attacks.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the CSP notation and theory which underpins this
approach. Section 3 describes the way CSP is used to model
and analyse security protocols and authentication proper-
ties, and presents the general approach to verification. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates the approach through a verification of the
amended Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. Section
5 discusses how the approach might also be applied to con-
fidentiality properties. Section 6 provides a general discus-
sion and comparison with other approaches.
2 CSP NOTATION
CSP is an abstract language designed specifically for the
description of communication patterns of concurrent sys-
tem components that interact through message passing. It is
underpinned by a theory which supports analysis of sys-
tems described in CSP. It is, therefore, well suited to the
description and analysis of network protocols: protocols
can be described within CSP, as can the relevant aspects of
the network. Their interactions can be investigated, and
certain aspects of their behavior can be verified through use
of the theory. Section 2 introduces the notation and ideas
used in this paper. In particular, only the traces model for
CSP is used here. For a fuller introduction to the language
the reader is referred to [7], [21].
2.1 Events
Systems are modeled in terms of the events that they can
perform. The set of all possible events (fixed at the begin-
ning of the analysis) is denoted S. Events may be atomic in
structure or may consist of a number of distinct compo-
nents. For example, an event put.5 consists of two parts: a
channel name put, and a data value 5. An example of events
used in this paper are those of the form c.i.j.m consisting of
a channel c, a source i, a destination j, and a message m. If
M and N are sets of messages, then M.N will be the set of
messages {m.n | m ¶ M ` n ¶ N}. If m is a single message
then we elide the set brackets and define m.N to be {m}. N.
Thus for example the set of messages i.N.m = {i.n.m | n ¶ N}.
A channel c is said to be of type M if any event c.m ¶ S has
that m ¶ M.
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2.2 Processes
Processes are the components of systems. They are the enti-
ties that are described using CSP, and they are described in
terms of the possible events that they may engage in. The
process Stop is the process that can engage in no events at
all; it is equivalent to deadlock. The output c!v  P is able
initially to perform only c.v, the output of v on channel c,
after which it behaves as P. The input c?x : T  P(x) can
accept any input x of type T along channel c, following
which it behaves as P(x). Its first event will be any event of
the form c.t where t ¶ T. The process P  Q (pronounced ‘P
choice Q’) can behave either as P or as Q: Its possible com-
munications are those of P and those of Q. An indexed form
of choice i¶I Pi is able to behave as any of its arguments Pi.
Processes may also be composed in parallel. If D is a set
of events then the process P u[D]u Q behaves as P and Q
acting concurrently, with the requirement that they have to
synchronize on any event in the synchronization set D;
events not in D may be performed by either process inde-
pendently of the other. A special form of parallel operator
in which the two components do not interact on any events
is P ||| Q which is equivalent to P u[{}]u Q.
Processes may be recursively defined by means of equa-
tional definitions. Process names must appear on the left-
hand side of such definitions, and CSP expressions which
may include those names appear on the right-hand side.
For example, the definition
LIGHT on off LIGHT= → →̂
defines a process LIGHT whose only possible behavior is to
perform on and off alternately.
Mutually recursive processes may also be defined, where
a (possibly infinite) collection of process names Xk appear
on the left-hand side of definitions, and CSP expressions
Fk(X) possibly involving any of those names appear on the
right. For example, the set of definitions
COUNT up COUNT
COUNT up COUNT
down COUNT
n n
n
0 1
1 2
= →
= →
→
+ +
̂
̂ ( )
h
define a collection of processes; COUNT0 can do any num-
ber of up and down events, but can never do more downs
than ups.
Process definitions may also contain conditions to sepa-
rate different cases. The collection of COUNT definitions
could be given as
COUNT
up COUNT m
up COUNT
down COUNT
m
m
m
m
=
→ =
→
→
+
+
−
̂
1
1
1
0if
( )
otherwiseh
or could be given by COUNT F COUNTm m=̂ ( )), where
F COUNT
up COUNT m
up COUNT
down COUNT
m
m
m
m
( )
if
( )
otherwise
=
→ =
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→
+
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−
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1
1
0
h
For readability, subscripted information may also appear
bracketed on the same line as its corresponding process: for
example, COUNTm may also be written as COUNT(m).
For a full discussion of single and mutually recursive
process definitions, see [3].
2.3 Traces
The semantics of a process P is defined to be the set of finite
sequences of events or traces (traces(P)) that it may possibly
perform. This set will always be nonempty, and prefix closed:
If tr is a possible trace of P, then so too is any prefix of tr. Ex-
amples of traces are ÉÙ (the empty trace, which is possible for
any process) and Éon, off, onÙ which is a possible trace of
LIGHT. Concatenation of traces is described using the nota-
tion tr1 X tr2, which is the sequence of events listed in tr1 fol-
lowed by those in tr2. Any trace is of the form ÉÙ or ÉaÙ X tr′
where a is an event and tr′  is the remainder of the trace.
A useful operator on traces is projection: if D is a set of
events then the trace tr |) D is defined to be the maximal sub-
sequence of tr all of whose events are drawn from D. If D is a
singleton set d then we overload notation and write tr |) d for
tr |) {d}. Message extraction tr  C for a set of channel names C
provides the maximal sequence of messages passed on chan-
nels C. Finally, tr ˙ C provides the set of messages in tr
passed along the channels in C. These may be described in-
ductively on sequences, and the last by a set comprehension:
kl kl
kl kl
kl
|
( )| ( | ) if
( |` ) otherwise
( )
( ) if .
( ) otherwise
{ |( )| }
)
X )
X )
X
X
)
D
d tr D d tr D d D
tr D
C
d tr C
m tr C c C d c m
tr C
tr C m tr C m
=
=
∈%&’
 =
 =  ∃ ∈ • =
%&’
 =  ≠
If tr is a sequence, then s(tr) is the set of events appearing
in the sequence. If an element a appears in the sequence tr,
then we write a tr. The operator s extends to processes: s(P)
is the set of events that appear in some trace of P.
2.4 Analyzing Processes
Specifications are given as predicates on traces, and a proc-
ess P satisfies a specification S (with tr as free variable) if all
of its traces satisfy S:
P sat S ˆ " tr ¶ traces(P)  S
Specifications are written with tr as the free trace variable.
For example,
LIGHT sat s(tr) µ {on, off}
2.5 Proof Rules
The traces model for CSP is associated with a proof system
for describing specifications on processes in terms of speci-
fications on their components. There is a proof rule for each
CSP operator, whose semantics in each case follows from
the trace semantics. For example, the rule for the prefix op-
erator is
P sat S
a  P sat (tr = ÉÙ ´
                  tr = ÉaÙ X tr’ ` S[tr’/tr])
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The predicate S[tr/tr] is S with all free occurrences of tr
substituted by tr.
Particular application domains are often concerned only
with particular forms of specification. It is often possible to
give more specialized proof rules for such specifications.
This amounts to developing a specialized theory and proof
system for the application area. The benefits are that the full
generality of the proof rules are not required, and that there
will often be lemmas and theorems, built on top of the
traces model, which allow higher-level reasoning. This is
the approach taken in this paper, where a key property
maintains r  used for verification is defined in terms of
traces, and various proof rules are provided for deducing
when particular process descriptions meet this property. We
will see the specialized rules in Figs. 3, 4, and 5.
2.6 Process Equivalences
The traces model for CSP supports a number of algebraic
equivalences on processes, whose soundness follows from
the trace semantics. These are often useful in manipulating
process descriptions into a form which is easier to reason
about. There are many laws expressing useful identities. For
the purposes of this paper, we will be interested in the effect
of restricting particular events of a parallel combination P
u[R]u Stop. This process restricts all of P’s occurrences of
events from R, so it has precisely those traces of P that do not
contain any event from R. The equations are given in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Equations for restricted parallel combinations.
Rule restrict.1 states that restricting a process on a
set of events R that it cannot perform has no effect. Rule
restrict.2 states that restricting a process on a set of
events distributes over interleaving.
Rules restrict.3 and restrict.4 are concerned with
the effect of a restriction on inputs and outputs.
These equations are used throughout the paper when-
ever a process of the form USERAu[R]u Stop is expanded.
They will not be referred to explicitly when used, in order
to avoid cluttering proofs.
3 THE GENERAL CSP MODEL
3.1 The CSP Network Description
The approach taken is to provide a CSP description of a
generalization of the Dolev-Yao model [5]. Here it is as-
sumed that the communications medium is entirely under
the control of the enemy, which can block, readdress, dupli-
cate, and fake messages. We will define a ‘generates’ rela-
tion £ which describes when new messages may be derived
from existing ones: S £ m means that knowledge of all the
messages in S is sufficient to produce m. This will be used
to capture the enemy’s ability to fake messages. In [22] the
roles of the passive medium and of the active enemy were
described using distinct CSP processes which enabled the
capabilities of the enemy to be separately described. For the
purposes of the approach to verification taken in this paper
it is preferable to describe the combination of the enemy
and the medium as a single CSP process ENEMY, since this
makes for an easier analysis.
There is a (finite) set USER consisting of the names of all
the agents which use the network. For each i ¶ USER we
associate a process USERi which describes how user i be-
haves. Each process USERi communicates with ENEMY by
means of a channel trans.i on which it transmits messages,
and a channel rec.i on which it receives messages. Thus, we
have s(USERi) µ trans.i < rec.i, where trans.i is shorthand
for trans.i.USER.MESSAGE and trans.j is shorthand for
trans.j.USER.MESSAGE.
The resulting network is then described as follows:
NET USER trans rec ENEMYj USER j= ∈(||| )|[ , ]|
This network is pictured in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. CSP model of the network.
In the analysis of a protocol we might consider A and B
as the two parties involved in the protocol, and the proc-
esses USERA and USERB will describe the respective roles
that they play.
If there are actually no other users connected to the sys-
tem, then we can have USERi = Stop for each i ¡ A B and we
obtain
NET USER USER trans rec ENEMYA B= ( ||| )|[ , ]|
We retain the names of other users in the set USER to retain
the potential of the ENEMY to masquerade as a genuine user.
The channels trans and rec are of type USER.USER. MES-
SAGE. An event trans.i.j.m models an occurrence of node i
sending a message m with destination j, and an event rec.j.i.m
models an occurrence of node j receiving a message m with
source i. Thus, i is the source, j the destination, and m the
message. The message space MESSAGE will generally be
defined by a context-free grammar, as in Section 3.1.3.
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Refusals have been abstracted away, in the sense that in-
put can never be refused. This amounts to making the as-
sumption that the enemy can deduce nothing from how or
when the messages are accepted. This is a reasonable as-
sumption, since there are protocols currently in use to per-
form tasks such as masking network traffic. Hence, at this
level of abstraction we can assume that messages are al-
ways accepted by the network. (If this is later felt to be un-
realistic, the definition can be altered accordingly, so that
messages may not be input after the number of messages in
the network reaches some threshold.) Attacks on protocols
(apart from denial of service attacks) tend to exploit unex-
pected interactions between messages, and the traces model
is adequate for capturing these.
3.1.1 Description of ENEMY
The capabilities of the enemy can be captured within a de-
scription that controls all trans.i and rec.i channels. Dolev
and Yao first formalized this kind of attacker in [5]. It is able
to accept any message output by any user, and it can also
provide to any user any input that it is able to generate. In
particular, this description gives the enemy the capability of
redirecting, spoofing, replaying and blocking messages, as
well as delivering them normally.
ENEMY S
trans i j m ENEMY S m
rec i j m ENEMY Sj j USER S m
( )
? ? ? ( { })
. ! ! ( ), , |_
=
→
→∈
<
h
h
           (1)
The argument S is the set of messages in the possession of
the enemy. It is augmented every time some input occurs,
and the messages m that may be output to agents are those
that can be generated from S. This is written S £ m, where £
will be defined in Section 3.1.4. In the output branch of the
choice, an arbitrary user i is chosen, and a message is out-
put to him along his rec.i channel.
The set of messages initially in the possession of the en-
emy will be given as a set INIT, and so ENEMY = ENEMY
(INIT).
The enemy also subsumes the actions of other subverted
or dishonest users by including their initial knowledge
(such as their private keys) in the set INIT.
3.1.2 Protocol Participants
The agents implementing the protocols place restrictions on
the messages that may be passed on trans, which in turn
restrict the possibilities for messages being passed on rec.
The agents A and B that are the participants in the proto-
col are modeled as USERA and USERB, consisting of CSP
implementations of the two halves of the protocol. More
generally, if there are other participants (such as trusted
third parties) then their activity will also be described as
CSP processes. Obviously their description will depend
entirely on the protocol being modeled.
The agents A and B which implement a run of the
amended Needham-Schroeder protocol may be modeled in
CSP as the processes USERA and USERB below. For the
purposes of illustrating the approach, we will first simplify
the analysis by considering only the case where A is the
initiator and B is the receiver. This model does not allow for
attacks where both parties act as initiators, or as receivers.
This restriction will be relaxed in Section 4.2, where we con-
sider the fully general case of each participant taking either
role, and potentially engaging in multiple concurrent runs
of the protocol.
USER
trans A i p n A
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop
A i USER
i A
A A
i
=
→
→
→
∈h
. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
         (2)
USER rec B j p y j
trans B j p y n B
rec B j p n Stop
B B
j B
B B
= →
→
→
. ? ? ( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
            (3)
3.1.3 Message Space
The message space we use for analysis of this protocol can
be considered as the language generated by the following
context-free grammar:
                              RAW ::= USER | TEXT
            | NONCE | KEY
MESSAGE ::= RAW | KEY(MESSAGE)
                                             | MESSAGE.MESSAGE
In fact for this example using public-key cryptography, the
space KEY will split into public keys PUBLIC and secret
keys SECRET, one of each for each user in USER:
KEY ::= PUBLIC | SECRET
We will adopt the following notational convention: u ¶
USER, r ¶ RAW, t ¶ TEXT, ni ¶ NONCE, pi ¶ PUBLIC, si ¶
SECRET, and m ¶ MESSAGE.
3.1.4 The ‘Generates’ Relation £
We have rules which encapsulate the properties of public
key cryptography, which describe the way messages may
be generated from existing ones. These rules define the
generates relation £.
A1  If m ¶ S then S £ m
A2  If S £ m and S µ S then S £ m
A3  If S £ mi for each mi ¶ S and S £ m then S £ m
M1  If S £ m and S £ k then S £ k(m)
M2  S £ m1 and S £ m2 if and only if S £ m1.m2
We are now in a position to prove that all messages passed
on rec must be generable from the initial set INIT together
with the messages input on trans:
THEOREM 3.1.
ENEMY    sat    (INIT < (tr ˙ trans)) £ tr ˙ rec
PROOF. We can prove easily by a mutual recursion induc-
tion that
ENEMY(S) sat S < (tr ˙ trans) £ tr ˙ rec
The result follows from the fact that ENEMY =̂
ENEMY(INIT). o
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3.1.5 Equations
We might also have equations on the message space. Some
natural ones would be those describing the relationship
between encryption and decryption:
E1        pA sA(m)) = sA(pA(m)) = m
There would also be properties such as associativity of
catenation:
E2        m1.(m2.m3) = (m1.m2).m3
Equations could also capture possible properties of encryp-
tion mechanisms. For example, commutativity of encryp-
tion is sometimes a necessary property (such as that re-
quired for Diffie-Hellman key exchange).
E3        k1(k2(m)) = k2(k1(m))
We will assume for the rest of this paper that (E1) and
(E2) are the only equations on the message space unless
explicitly stated otherwise. We will write m1 =E m2 if m1 and
m2 are equivalent under E1 and E2.
We will also assume and that A1—A3 and M1—M2 de-
fine the relation £.
3.1.6 Modeling Issues
There are a number of issues concerning the way the protocol
has been modeled. The use of pattern matching on message
input corresponds to the assumption that any message that
fails to match the pattern would be ignored, though we are
modelling this as blocking receipt rather than accepting and
throwing it away: the USERi processes simply do not accept
any message which does not match the pattern. In practice,
this is unlikely to be achievable, especially in cases where an
agent must decrypt a message before finding out if it is of a
particular form. However, it does not affect the ability of the
enemy to attack protocols described in this way.
Typing of messages is also implicit in pattern matching.
The type of the channel determines the range of possible
messages that might match the pattern. The permissible
input for the code fragment rec.A.i?pA(nA.x)  ⁄ described
in line 2 of USERA depends on the type of x. A correct run
of the protocol would have x as a nonce, but without the
ability to type messages the input could accept an arbitrary
message for x. For the purposes of this paper, we will as-
sume that inputs defined by pattern matching must also
conform to the expected type. This amounts to assuming
that it is not possible for a message of one type to be mis-
taken for a message of another type.
In line 2 the pattern matching amounts to any message of
the form pA(nA.x.i) being accepted for any nonce x, provided i
matches the i chosen as the destination of the first message.
Freshness of nonces nA and nB is captured in the fact that
neither of them appears in INIT, and in the fact that the defi-
nition of the generates relation £ does not have any clause
pertaining to generation of nonces. In other words, an agent
(or the enemy) can generate a nonce only if it is already in his
possession. The generation of a fresh nonce is modeled by
making it known initially only to a single agent—only that
agent is able to produce it. Of course, this is for analysis pur-
poses only; in practice, nonces will be produced by mecha-
nisms such as random number generation.
The apparent source j of B’s first message (line 3) must
match the source given in the message itself, since that in-
formation is the only information B has concerning the
originator of the protocol.
3.2 Authentication
A message-oriented approach to authentication is discussed
in [22]. Authentication will be captured in terms of events
(generally transmission and receipt of particular messages)
whose occurrence guarantees the prior occurrence of other
messages. An authentication protocol generally achieves its
aims by allowing a participant to infer from receipt of a
message that the other party must have previously been
involved in the protocol run. The key property is concerned
with precedence between events: any element of a set of
events T must have been preceded by occurrence of some
element from the set of events R. This is captured as a speci-
fication as follows:
DEFINITION 3.2.
R T tr R tr Tprecedes = = ⇒ =̂ | |) )kl kl
A number of aspects of authentication can be captured in
this style: Data origin authentication allows B to confirm that
the response to his nonce challenge really was generated by
A, who knows she is talking to B. This is captured by the
specification ‘trans.A.B.pB(nB) precedes rec.B.A.pB(nB)‘. Re-
ceipt by B of the message pB(nB) guarantees that A trans-
mitted it earlier to B. This property will be the one verified
in Section 4 of this paper.
This property may also be considered as describing peer
entity authentication, provided freshness could also be es-
tablished, since it would provide a guarantee that at the time
of the protocol run it was indeed A communicating with B.
Freshness could be expressed by the requirement that
trans.A.B.pB(nB) must occur after the beginning of the proto-
col run, and hence that it is preceded by trans.A.B.pB(nA.A).
This latter property is easily verified by an examination of
USERA.
A weaker version of peer entity authentication might
have B simply requiring confirmation of the identity of A.
This might be captured by the specification ‘{trans.A.j.pj(nB)| j ∈ USER} precedes rec.B.A.pB(nB)’. On receipt of the re-
sponse to the nonce challenge, B can confirm that A did
indeed respond to the nonce challenge, but possibly to a
different agent. Again, freshness should also be established.
Data origin authentication for B’s message is captured by
the specification
     "n : NONCE  trans.B.A.pA(nA.n.B)
                                     precedes rec.A.B.pA(nA.n.B)
On receipt of any response to her nonce challenge, A con-
firms that the response was generated by B and B knows
that he is talking to A.
One benefit of this approach is that it supports the expres-
sion of different authentication requirements rather than at-
tempting to provide a definitive version of “authentication.”
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of
the definition. This is useful for relating the rank function
approach to the authentication properties.
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LEMMA 3.3.
P sat R precedes T ˆ
                 P u[R]u Stop sat tr |) T = kl
The CSP trace semantics also support a number of spe-
cialized proof rules for establishing when particular proc-
esses provide specific precedes properties. Those used in
this paper are given in Figs. 3 and 4.
The soundness of the rules follows from the trace se-
mantics of the operators and the formal definition of R
precedes T. We may give informal justification of their
soundness by considering that occurrence of an event
from T is intended to provide evidence that some event
from R previously occurred. Hence a process fails to sat-
isfy R precedes T only when it is possible for some event
from T to occur before any event from R.
Rule auth.stop is therefore sound because Stop cannot
perform any events at all, and so cannot perform some T
before any R.
Rule auth.prefix.1 is sound because if the very first
event a performed by a  P is an event from R, then it is
not possible for an event from T to occur before an event
from R. This is independent of the nature of the subsequent
process P, which therefore has no restrictions placed on it
by the rule—the rule is applicable for any process P.
Rule auth.prefix.2 is most useful when the event a is
not in R, since otherwise auth.prefix.1 is applicable. In
this case it states that if the first event is not in T, then oc-
currence of a is irrelevant to authentication of R by T, and
such authentication is guaranteed for a  P whenever it is
guaranteed for P.
Rule auth.choice states that if each branch of a choice
guarantees the authentication property R precedes T, then
so does the entire choice—since whenever some event from
T occurs, it must have been performed by one of the arms
of the choice, and that choice must previously have per-
formed some event from R.
Rule auth.parallel states that if a single component P
of a parallel combination is able to guarantee that R pre-
cedes T, and it is involved in all occurrences of events from
T, then that is enough to ensure that the entire parallel
combination P u[A]u Q guarantees it: P will not allow any
event from T to occur before an event from R occurs. There
are no restrictions on the rest of the system Q, so the rule
holds for any process description Q.
Rule auth.interleaves states that if both components
of an interleaved combination can guarantee R precedes T,
then the combination itself can. This follows from the fact
that if some event from T occurs, then it must have been
performed by one of the component processes, which must
have previously performed an event from R.
Finally, the rule auth.recursion for mutually recursive
processes states that if the property R precedes T is pre-
served by recursive calls then it holds for the recursively de-
fined process. This rule is a special case of the general rule for
recursion; for further details, see the discussion in [3].
3.3 General Proof Strategy
3.3.1 Rank Functions
In order to prove that a network meets a particular authen-
tication property expressed as R preceding T, it will be nec-
essary to establish that no event in T can be generated any-
where in the system if all occurrences of events in R are
blocked. A rank function r : MESSAGES  Z on messages
will be used to establish this. The intention is that the value
associated with any message that can circulate in the net-
work should be strictly positive; and that the values associ-
ated with messages appearing as parts of events in T
should be 0 or less.
If r : MESSAGE  Z is a function defined on messages,
then we lift it to sets of messages S and sequences of mes-
sages seq as follows:
Fig. 3. Proof rules for authentication: prefix and choice.
Fig. 4. Proof rules for authentication: parallel and recursion.
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                             r(S) = min {r(s) | s ¶ S}
r(seq) = min {r(m) | c.m in seq}
The rank of an event c.m is the rank of the message m.
The definition of r must respect the equations on the
space of messages in order to be well-defined. In the case of
this paper this means that it should respect E1 and E2.
The property required by each component is that it can-
not introduce any message whose rank is less than 1. In
other words, if all it has ever received is messages of strictly
positive rank, then so should it has ever transmitted. This
property may be captured as a specification maintains r
on traces:
DEFINITION 3.4.
maintains ρ
ρ ρ
=
 > ⇒ >
̂
( ) ( | )tr rec tr trans0 0)
Observe that this is parameterized by the rank func-
tion r.
If USERi meets this specification then it cannot introduce
a message of rank 0 or less into the system (along channel
trans.i) if there was not one already present (which was re-
ceived along channel rec.i).
The following theorem is at the heart of the proof strat-
egy presented in this paper.
THEOREM 3.5. If
R1:  "m ¶ INIT  r(m)  1
R2:  "S, m 
        ((" s ¶ S  r(s)  1) ` S £ m ˘ r(m)  1)
R3:  "t ¶ T  r(t)  0
R4:  (USERi |[R]| Stop sat maintans r) for each user i
then NET sat R precedes T
The proof of this theorem appears in Appendix A.
The requirements of the theorem combine to establish
that only messages of strictly positive rank can circulate in
NET |[R] Stop, and hence that nothing in T can be gener-
ated if all events in R are blocked. This means that any oc-
currence of an event in T indicates that an event in R must
have occurred previously.
The theorem describes a number of key properties re-
quired of the rank function. Properties R1 and R2 together
yield the result that the enemy cannot introduce messages
which fail to meet preserve strictly positive rank: if the en-
emy begins with such messages, and only ever sees mes-
sages of strictly positive rank, then only such messages can
be generated. Property R4 provides the same guarantee for
all of the users. Property R3 is used to deduce that no event
from T can, therefore, be generated.
Observe that the construction of a suitable rank function
is dependent on R and T as well as the descriptions of the
users. In other words, it is dependent both on the protocol
and on the particular property to be established.
3.3.2 Proof Obligations
Theorem 3.5 relies on the assumption that
"i  s(USERi) >  (trans < rec) µ trans.i < rec.i
i.e., that no user except USERi has any interaction with
ENEMY on the channels trans.i or rec.i. This assumption is
built into the way we are modeling the network.
As discussed earlier, authentication properties expressed
in CSP are in the form ‘R precedes T,’ meaning that if some
event from T occurs then some event from R must previ-
ously have occurred. Generally T will be a set of possible
inputs which might be received at a particular node, pro-
viding evidence of the occurrence of one of a set of outputs
R at a different node.
The proof strategy we adopt is to show that if all occur-
rences of events R are prevented in NET, then the events in
T is not possible. In other words, we aim to show that the
events in T cannot be generated by the resulting system
description NET |[R]| Stop.
To apply Theorem 3.5 we must meet the list of require-
ments R1 to R4. Some of these correspond to assumptions
which we must be confident can be made, and others are
proof obligations.
Item R1 is an assumption on the enemy, and confidence
in it will depend on the nature of r, and on the messages
that have nonpositive rank.
Item R2 must be checked, and may be established by an
induction over the definition of the generates relation £. It
therefore relies on the fact that the clauses defining £ com-
pletely determine which messages can be generated from
already known ones. Item R3 must be shown for the par-
ticular set T. Item R4 must be proven for the cases (R4a):
USERA |[R]| Stop and (R4b): USERB |[R]} Stop.
3.3.3 Specialized CSP Proof Rules
There are also a number of rules which can be given con-
cerning the relationship between various CSP operators and
the maintains r specification. These are given in Fig. 5.
They are all sound with respect to the CSP traces model.
Together with the equations of Fig. 1 they will be used in
establishing R4a and R4b in various cases.
Informally, their soundness can be justified as follows.
Rule stop is sound because Stop is unable to violate main-
tains r since to do so requires an output of a message of
nonpositive rank, and Stop can perform no output. Rule
output states that if the first output provided by a process
has positive rank, then the process satisfies maintains
provided that the behavior after this first output does not
violate it.
Rule input is concerned with the behavior of a process
subsequent to an input. The requirement to maintain posi-
tive rank is concerned that if messages coming in have
positive rank, then the messages going out should also
have positive rank. For a particular incoming message,
there are therefore two cases to consider: if the input mes-
sage f(x) has rank 0 or less, then the subsequent behavior is
irrelevant since responsibility for maintaining positive rank
is no longer required; and if the message f x) input has
positive rank, then the subsequent process P(j, x) should
maintain positive rank. Hence the rule states that the input
process rec.i?j?f(x)  P(j, x) satisfies maintains r whenever
P(j, x) does so after an input of positive rank. The form of
the input f (x) describes the pattern matching implicit in the
input process: f describes the input patterns allowed.
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Finally, rule choice states that if each branch of a choice
maintains positive rank, then so does the entire choice.
4 ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED
NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PROTOCOL
The protocol to be analyzed is as described in Section 1:
                                 A  B    :    pB(nA.A)
B  A    :    pA(nA.nB.B)
                                 A  B    :    pB(nB)
The property to be proved as an illustration of the ap-
proach is that receipt by B from A of the message pB(nB)
guarantees that A previously sent that message to B. This is
expressed as the CSP specification
trans.A.B.pB(nB) precedes rec.B.A.pB(nB)
This may be considered as an entity authentication prop-
erty, establishing that B can be sure he is in communication
with A. It can also be considered as a data origin authenti-
cation property, establishing for B that the source of the
message pB(nB) must be A.
4.1 Proof
In order to establish that a run of this protocol has
trans.A.B.pB(nB) guaranteed by rec.B.A.pB(nB) we use the CSP
description
USER trans A i p n A
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop
A i USER i A
A A
i
= →
→
→
∈h . ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
            
USER rec B A p y A
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
B B
A B
B B
= →
→
→
. . ? ( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
The property of user B authenticating user A sending
pB(nB) requires that if B engages in the protocol as if A is the
initiator, then A is indeed the initiator.
Hence, we are interested only in those executions of B
which begin with some message of the form rec.B.A.m,
where the source of message m appears to be A. The de-
scription required for the analysis is the description USERB
under the restriction that B takes the first message to have
A as its source.
The rank function described in Fig. 6 is suitable for an
application of Theorem 3.5: it meets properties R1 æ æ æ æ-R4. In
particular
R4a     USERA|[trans.A.B.pB(nB)]| Stop
                  sat maintains r
R4b  Since trans.A.B.pB(nB) • s (USERB), it follows that
         USERB |[trans.A.B.pB(nB)]|Stop = USERB, so we
         have only to prove
UserB sat maintains r
Each of the properties must be examined in turn.
Fig. 6. Rank function for verification of Lowe’s amended protocol.
Well-definedness of r. Since r is defined on the struc-
ture of the messages, it is necessary to check that any equa-
tions on the message space hold: any two forms of the same
message must have the same rank.
Fig. 5. Proof rules for maintains r.
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It is immediate from the definition of r that equations E1
and E2 both hold:
r(pi(si(m))) = r(si(pi(m))) = r(m)
and
r(m1.(m2.m3)) = r((m1.m2).m3)
R1. We assume that "m ¶ INIT  r(m)  1. This is a rea-
sonable assumption, amounting to the claim that the enemy
does not initially have access to sA, sB, or nB, or messages
constructed from these.
R2. We obtain the following result from a consideration
of each clause in turn of the definition of £: A1–A3, M1–M2.
The result follows from the fact that £ is defined to be the
smallest relation closed under all of the clauses.
(" s ¶ S  r(s)  1) ` S £ m ˘ r(m)  1
R3. Observe that r(pB(nB)) = 0.
R4a (USERA). We want to establish that
USERA| [trans.A.B.pB(nB)]| Stop
                                sat  maintains r
For a given x ¶ NONCE, either x ¡ nB or x = nB.
If x ¡ nB it follows that r(x)  1 and so r(pi(x))  1 (for any
i), and hence that
trans.A!i!pi(x) Stop sat maintains r              (4)
For the second case it is immediate that Stop sat maintains
r.
Hence, we have that
trans A i p x Stop x n
Stop x n
i B
B
. ! ! ( ) if
if
→ ≠
=




sat maintains ρ
This provides the antecedent for Rule input to yield
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop x n
Stop x n
A A
i B
B
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( ) if
if
→
→ ≠
=




sat maintains ρ
And so from Rule output (since r(pi(nA.A))  1) we have for
any i that
trans A i p n A
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop x n
Stop x n
i A
A A
i B
B
. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( ) if
if
→
→
→ ≠
=




sat maintains ρ
            (5)
Finally we obtain from Rule choice that
hi USER
i A
A A
i B
B
trans A i p n A
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop x n
Stop x n
∈
→
→
→ ≠
=




. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( ) if
if
sat maintains ρ
Since this process is equivalent to USERA
|[trans.A.B.pB(nB)]| Stop by the rules of Fig. 1, the proof is
complete.
R4b (USERB). Rule stop and Rule input (with trivial
antecedent) yield that
rec.B.A.pB(nB)  Stop
sat     maintains r                             (6)
Now for any nonce y r(pB(y.A))  1 implies that r(y)  1
which in turn implies that r(pA(y.nB.B))  1, we obtain from
Rule output that
r(pB(y.A))  1 ˘
       trans.B!A!pA(y.nB.B) 
    rec.B.A.pB(nB)  Stop
                         sat maintains r                               (7)
This provides the antecedent for Rule input to yield
rec.B.A?pB(y.A) 
   trans.B!A!pA(y.nB.B) 
      rec.B.A.pB(nB)  Stop
                          sat maintains r
or in other words USERB sat maintains r, as required.
This completes the proof that the occurrence of
rec.B.A.pB(nB) guarantees the prior occurrence of
trans.A.B.pB(nB): B’s receipt of nB encrypted under his own
public key provides evidence that A transmitted the mes-
sage trans.A.B.pB(nB).
The properties of r that were used in the proof, as side-
conditions to the proof rules, were
1) r(pA(nA.x.i))  1 ` x ¡ nB ` x ¶ NONCE ˘ r(pi(x))  1
for any i (used to obtain line 4);
2) r(pi(nA.A))  1 for all i (used to obtain line 5);
3) r(y)  1 ` y ¶ NONCE ˘ r(pA(y.nB.B))  1 (used to
obtain line 7);
4) " m ¶ INIT  r(m)  1 (required for R1);
5) r(pB(nB)) = 0 (required for R3)
Properties (1) and (3) use the fact that x and y are as-
sumed to be nonces (rather than arbitrary messages), as
discussed below.
Observe that the proof works even if r(sB) = 1. This
means that A can be authenticated to B even if B’s own se-
cret key is compromised. This is reasonable, since the fact
that sB is known only to B is really required by A rather
than by B.
4.1.1 An Aside on Typing
The proof above uses the fact that messages are typed: the
pattern matching built into the analysis of USERA
|[trans.A.B.pB(nB)] | Stop assumes that all inputs that
USERA will accept on rec.A will be of the form
i.pA(NONCE.NONCE.i). In other words, the description of
USERA assumes that the message i.pA(nA.x.i) will be rejected
unless x is a nonce.
In fact, the minimal assumption required is simply that
user A is able to recognize a message of the form pA(nA.x.i)
for arbitrary messages x, and to extract the message x from
this. The approach is still applicable, but at the cost of
added complexity. The CSP descriptions of the processes
will be more general since they will permit more inputs,
and so the rank function will have to be preserved under
more general conditions. For example, an untyped USERB
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which can accept any message y (rather than any nonce y)
does not preserve the rank function of Fig. 6 since it can
accept pB(nA.nC.A) which has rank 1 and then transmit
pA(nA.nC.nB.B) which has rank 0.
In fact, the protocol is still secure, but the rank function
required to establish this is more complicated. In fact, two
rank functions are needed, to cover the two cases where A
has chosen to send to B, and where A has chosen to send to
a user other than B (as explained in Section 5). Their con-
struction is left as an exercise for the interested reader.
A verification of the general untyped case will establish
that there are no attacks which can exploit type confusion
between messages. A verification restricted to typed mes-
sages will be more straightforward (and sometimes possible
when the general case is not), but should be accompanied
by the caveat that an implementation should be able to rec-
ognize the types of the messages it is dealing with.
4.2 Multiple Runs
All the analysis performed above has been on a system
where there is but a single run of the protocol between A
and B, and where A and B take the roles of initiator and
responder, respectively. While it is possible informally to
generalize the verifications to systems with repeated runs
of the protocol, it is also possible to describe in CSP the
situation where agents perform multiple runs of the proto-
col and hence provide a formal verification. Analysis of a
single run allows attention to be focused on the two par-
ticipants of the run. In the case where we have multiple
runs, it is appropriate to model the two parties as able to
engage in other runs with any other parties, and to restrict
their behavior only for the protocol run under analysis. This
is the approach that we shall take.
One issue to be addressed concerns the requirement to
use a fresh nonce on every protocol run. This may be
modeled in CSP by using an infinite sequence of nonces
where nA,k and nB,k are used on the kth run of A and B, re-
spectively. The kth run of the protocol will be defined in
terms of what occurs during that run, and when the k +
1th run can commence.
This requires a proof rule for recursive definitions, which
is given in Fig. 7. Recursive definitions are of the form Nl =̂
Fl(N), where each Fl is a function on CSP process expressions,
containing instances of various Nl process names. The rule
states that if it can be shown that each Fl(X) satisfies mrp from
the inductive assumption that all of the Xl satisfy maintains
r, then we may conclude that each Nl in the recursive defini-
tion does in fact satisfy maintains r (The base case of the
induction is that Stop satisfies maintains r, and this is al-
ready given by Rule stop of Fig. 5.).
The users are defined in terms of a mutual recursion. In
this case we model each user as being prepared either to
initiate or to respond to a fresh run of the protocol at any
stage, independently of the number of runs it is already
involved in at that time.
The protocol will be investigated as to whether an arbi-
trary run provides authentication—such a run will be the
kth run for some k.
The individual process names Nl will be given as
USERA(l) and USERB(l) for the two families of mutually
recursive definitions defining users A and B, respectively.
UserA( )
. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
||| ( )
)
. ! ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
||| ( )
,
,
l
trans A i p n A
rec A i p n x i
trans A i p x Stop
USER l
rec. A j p y j
trans A j p y n A
rec A j p n Stop
USER l
i USER
i A
A A
i
A
A
j A l
A A l
A
=
→
→
→
+






→
→
→
+






∈h
h
1
1
? ? ( .
The description of USERB is entirely similar, with B re-
placing A throughout.
UserB
i USER
i B
B B l
i
B
B
j B l
B B l
B
l
trans B i p n B
rec B i p n x i
trans B i p x Stop
USER l
rec. B j p y j
trans B j p y n B
rec B j p n Stop
USER l
( )
. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
||| ( )
)
. ! ? ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
,
=
→
→
→
+






→
→
→
+






∈h
h
1
1
? ? ( .
We define USERA = USERA(0) and USERB = USERB(0).
As an example we will prove the equivalent of the first
property: that rec.B.A.pB(nB,k) authenticates trans.A.B.pB(nB,k)
for any given k. In other words, if B’s kth run of the protocol
is initiated by A and is between A and B, then B’s receipt of
the final message authenticates that A sent that message.
The description of USERB(k) will be restricted to reflect
the fact that the analysis is with respect to this run.
UserB
B
A B l
B B l
B
k
rec. B A p y A
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
USER k
( )
. )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
=
→
→
→
+






? ( .
1
The descriptions of the other USERB(l) and all the USERA(l)
processes will remain unchanged.
Fig. 7. Further proof rules for maintains r.
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An appropriate rank function is given in Fig. 8. It is very
similar to the rank function in Fig. 6.
This rank function meets R0–R3. We have only to prove R4a
for USERA and R4b for USERB to establish that
rec.B.A.pB(nB, k) authenticates trans.A.B.pB(nB, k) for k.
R4a (USERA). We have that
UserA B B k
i USER
i A
A A l
B k
i
A
B B k
l trans A B p n Stop
trans A i p n A
rec A j p n x i
Stop
i B
x n
trans A i p x
Stop
USER l
trans A B p n
Stop
( ) |[ . . . ( )]|
. ! ! ( . )
. ? ? ( . . )
if and
. ! ! ( )
otherwise
|||
( )
|[ . . . ( )]|
,
,
,
,
= =
→
→
=
=
→
%
&
KK
’
KKK
+











∈h
1
                       
h
rec. A j p y j
trans A j p y n A
rec A j p n Stop
USER l
trans A B p n
Stop
A
j A l
A A l
A
B B k
? ? ( . )
. ? ? ( . . )
. . . ( ) |||
( )
|[ . . . ( )]|
,
,
,
→
→
→
+








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It is straightforward to prove that
rec A i p n x i
Stop i B x n
trans A i p x Stop
A A l
B k
i
. ? ? ( . . )
if and
. ! ! ( ) otherwise
,
,
→
= =
→




sat maintains ρ
since r(pA(nA,l.x.i))  1 ˘
((i = B ` x = nB,k) ´ r(pi(x))  1).
Under the inductive assumption that USERA(l + 1)
|[trans.A.B.pB(nB, k)]| Stop sat maintains r, Rule inter-
leaves yields that
rec A j p n x i
Stop i B x n
trans A i p x
Stop
USER l trans A B p n Stop
A A l
B k
i
A B B k
. ? ? ( . . )
if and
. ! ! ( )
otherwise
|||
( )|[ . . . ( )]|
,
,
,
→
= =
→






+ 1
sat maintains ρ
Rules choice and output together with the fact that
r(pi(nA,l.A))  1 for any i, yield that the first branch of the
choice satisfies maintains r.
Similar reasoning yields that the second branch of the
choice also satisfies maintains r, and so we deduce that
the process body of the equation for USERA(l)
|[trans.A.B.pB(nB,k)]| Stop satisfies maintains r. Hence, we
conclude that
USER trans A B p n StopA B B k|[ . . . ( )]|,
sat maintains ρ
as required.
R4b (USERB). Since trans.A.B.pB(nB, k)] • s(USERB) for
any l, we need only to prove that USERB sat maintains
r, which will be achieved by establishing it for each l.
We begin with the inductive hypothesis that USERB(l) sat
maintains r for each l.
We must consider the case where l = k separately from
the case where l ¡ k.
Case l = k:
USER l
rec B A p y A
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
USER k
B
B
A B k
B B k
B
( )
. . ? ( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
=
→
→
→
+





1
An application of Rule input (with trivial antecedent)
and an application of Rule output with the observation
that r(pA(y.nB,k.B))  1 yields that
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
A B k
B B k
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
,
,
→
→
sat maintains ρ
Rule interleave with the inductive hypothesis on
USERB(k + 1) yields
Fig. 8. Rank function for verification of the kth run.
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trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
USER k
A B k
B B k
B
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
→
→
+





1
sat maintains ρ
and so finally
rec B A p y A
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
USER k
B
A B k
B B k
B
. . ? ( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
→
→
+





1
sat maintains ρ
Hence, we conclude that
USERB(l)    sat    maintains r                (8)
Case l ¡ k: In this case the recursive equation is
USERB
i USER
i B
B B l
i
B
B
j B l
B B l
B
l
trans B i p n B
rec B i p n x i
trans B i p x Stop
USER l
rec. B?j?p y j
trans B j p y n B
rec B j p n Stop
USER l
( )
. ! ! ( . )
. . ? ( . . )
. ! ! ( )
||| ( )
( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
||| ( )
,
,
,
=
→
→
→
+






→
→
→
+






∈h
h
1
1
Again the proof is almost identical to that provided for
USERA(l) |[trans.A.B.pB(nB,k)] |Stop. The requirements on r
required for Rules input and output to be applied are
similar to those in Section 4.1:
1) r(pB(nB,l.x.i))  1 ˘ r(pi(x))  1;
2) r(pi(nB,l.B))  1;
3) r(pB(y.j))  1 ˘ r(pj(y.nB,l.B))  1
The first two arise from the first branch of the choice,
and the third arises from the second branch. They are all
easily checked, bearing in mind that l ¡ k means that nB,l ¡
nB,k and so r(nB,l.B) = 1. The required result follows from an
application of Rule choice and finally of Rule recursion.
Hence, we obtain for any l ¡ k that
USERB(l)     sat    maintains r
Since USERB(k) sat maintains r has already been estab-
lished, Rule recursion yields that
USERB    sat     maintains r
as required.
Since the proof is valid for arbitrary k we deduce that on
any protocol run receipt of the nonce challenge confirms
that it was appropriately sent by the other party.
5 CONFIDENTIALITY
Authentication protocols are often concerned with key dis-
tribution, and so their authentication requirements may be
bound up with other required properties of the protocol,
such as the establishing of a good key, or the guarantee that
at the end of the run the protocol’s nonces are known only
to the participants.
Authentication is distinct from confidentiality, and each
might be provided by a protocol when the other is not. For
example, an alternative way to provide authentication is to
sign nonce challenges, but this approach does not also pro-
vide confidentiality. In general, the guarantee that each
party is communicating with the other does not in itself
ensure confidentiality, which must, therefore, be provided
separately. However, in some situations, an attack on
authentication may also provide an attack on confidential-
ity. For example, in the case of the protocol discussed in this
paper, the nonces nA and nB might be expected to be secret
to A and B, yet Lowe’s attack allows the intruder to obtain
them both because the absence of authentication allows a
third party to be involved in the protocol run.
Confidentiality is also expressible in terms of CSP speci-
fications, with only a slight adaptation to the model of the
network. In order to describe cleanly in terms of messages
whether or not the enemy can obtain a particular message,
it is useful to add an additional channel knows to the enemy,
which allows him to communicate anything he has de-
duced. The enemy’s activity on this channel is similar to
that on the rec channels. The definition of the enemy will be
extended with the following branch of a choice:
ENEMY S
knows m ENEMY Sm
( )
! ( )
=
→
K
hhS`
Confidentiality for a particular message m0 will simply
require that m0 should never appear on knows, which is eas-
ily specified as
tr |\  knows.m0 = ÉÙ
From the point of view of agent B, one of the confidentiality
requirements is that his own nonce nB remains secret. This
is captured as the requirement that
NET sat tr |\  knows.nB = ÉÙ
where USERA and USERB are as described in Section 4.1:
USERA is honest but could undergo a protocol run with
anyone; and USERB has a protocol run with A, since this
property is concerned with confidentiality from B’s point of
view.
The approach to establishing this will again use rank
functions, and apply a theorem similar to Theorem 3.5
adapted to address confidentiality. One simplification will
be that the network NET does not need to be constrained on
any events, so the unrestricted descriptions of USERA and
USERB will be analyzed to ensure that they preserve the
rank. Requirements R1 and R2 (with R = fi) still need to be
checked to ensure that the enemy cannot reduce the rank;
finally, the equivalent of R3 requires the rank of the confi-
dential message nB itself to have rank 0. The construction of
a rank function that meets these properties is left to the in-
terested reader.
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There is a second property which B requires of the proto-
col: that any nonce which is accepted as A’s nonce challenge
during the protocol run is indeed known only to A. Unlike
nB, this nonce is not known to B at the beginning of the run,
and this makes the expression of the property more intricate.
This second property expressed in the form tr |\  knows.n
= ÉÙ is too strong: any intruder could supply the first mes-
sage pB(n.A) to B, and in this case n will not be secret. The
property that is required is that if B completes a protocol
run, apparently with A, then the nonce that B has accepted
is known only to A and B. This is a kind of conditional con-
fidentiality, requiring for any n that if pB(n.A) is the first
message of the protocol, and the protocol runs to comple-
tion (as indicated by the occurrence of the final message
pB(nB)), then tr |\  knows.n = ÉÙ. This may be expressed as the
following CSP specification:
" y: NONCE   rec.B.A.pB(y.A) in tr ` pB(nB) in
               ˘ tr |\  knows.y = ÉÙ.
This description of the property is appropriate for the
CSP description of a single run. If multiple runs are to be
considered, then it would have to be more carefully crafted
to ensure that the message n corresponds to the same run as
the nB,k. One way of achieving this would be to alter the
CSP description by labeling each message in the run with
the number of the run l (e.g., trans.B.A.m will become
trans.B.A.l.m); the label could not be tampered with by the
enemy, it would be entirely under the control of the user
and maintained purely to keep track of the runs for model-
ling purposes. The confidentiality property would then
require that if y were the nonce received in the kth run, and
that run were to terminate, then y could not be known to
the enemy.
This property, and the previous one concerning knows.nB,
do not hold for the original Needham-Schroeder protocol.
There is no single rank function that can guarantee that
NET meets this specification by assigning rank 0 to any
nonce n which might appear on knows, for then nA would
have to have rank 0 (since the protocol can run to comple-
tion with this nonce). Yet A is able to send nA to any agent,
so USERA will not maintain positive r. However, a family
of rank functions may still be used to address the different
possibilities for execution: the various nonces that B can
receive, and the various agents that A might choose to
communicate with.
The specification above is equivalent to the following:
" n : NONCE  rec.B.A.pB(n.A) in tr ˘
                tr |\  pB(nB) = ÉÙ
                       ´ tr |\  knows.n = ÉÙ
Either the protocol does not complete, or the nonce ac-
cepted by B should be secret.
The choices for USERB can be expressed more explicitly
as follows:
USER USER y
USER y rec B A p y A
trans B A p y n B
rec B A p n Stop
B y NONCE B
B B
A B
B B
=
= →
→
→
∈h ( )
( ) . . . ( . )
. ! ! ( . . )
. . . ( )
Similarly, USERA can be expressed as a choice over all of
the users with whom she might undertake a protocol run:
USERA = hi¶USER USERA(i), where USERA(i) is given by
USERA(i) = trans.A!i!pi(nA.A) 
                                                 rec.A.i?pA(nA.x.i) 
                                                     trans.A!i!pi(x)  Stop
In the traces model, all of the choices that are possible for
the network components can be distributed over the paral-
lel composition.
USER USER ENEMY INIT
USER i
USER y
ENEMY INIT
A B
i USER A
y NONCE B
i USER y NONCE
USER i USER y
ENEMY INIT
A B
||| || ( )
( )
||| ( )
|| ( )
,
( )|| ( )
| ( )
=




=
∈
∈
∈ ∈




h
h
h
This means that the various cases for USERA(i) and
USERB(y) can be separately verified against the specifica-
tion, and if all cases meet the specification, then the fol-
lowing general rule guarantees that the overall choice must
also meet it:
∀ •j V S
V S
j
j j
sat
sath
The cases to consider divide into i = B and i ¡ B, and y =
nA and y ¡ nA. In each of these cases, a rank function can be
provided which has either r(pB(nB)) = 0 or r(y) = 0, and
which is preserved by both USERA(i) and USERB(y), guar-
anteeing either that the protocol cannot complete or that the
nonce y accepted by B cannot appear on knows.
For example, when i ¡ B, then an appropriate rank func-
tion is
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 2 1 2
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
11
1
( )
( )
( )
if
otherwise
( )
( )
if or
otherwise
( ) ( )
( )( )) ( )
if and
. .
( ) otherwise
( )( )) ( )
if and
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( ) otherwise
)
( . ) min{ ( ), ( )}
u
t
n
n n
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=
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=
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=
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In this case ρ(pB(nB)) = 0: B’s part of the protocol run will
not terminate.
(Construction of the rank functions for the other cases is
left as an exercise for the interested reader.) Different cases
require different rank functions, but they all establish the
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same property for their particular case, so that property
must hold for the complete description NET. All the rank
functions allow nonces other than nA and nB to have rank 1
(so in the case of y ¡ nB it is necessary to show that the pro-
tocol cannot complete, that is, that ρ(pB(nB)) = 0).
Hence, it appears that the rank function approach will
extend to handle confidentiality properties, though the ex-
pression of such properties can be more delicate.
6 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown how the theory of CSP might
be specialized to provide a theory for reasoning about
authentication protocols. The process of verification re-
quires the assumptions about encryption mechanisms and
about the capability of a hostile agent to be made explicit.
The theory includes a CSP model of the framework con-
taining the protocol; rules for establishing authentication of
messages within a single agent; and a general theorem for
deducing authentication between agents from their proper-
ties with respect to a rank function ρ on messages, together
with rules for deriving the required properties. We have
also considered how the approach can be adapted to handle
confidentiality properties.
We find that construction of the rank function forces
consideration of the precise reasons why a protocol is ex-
pected to work. In this respect, it should reflect the under-
standing of the protocol designer and make this under-
standing precise and explicit. Failed attempts to construct a
rank function may also provide insight as to why a protocol
does not provide authentication.
The CSP language, in common with other process alge-
bras such as CCS, provides a language suitable for the de-
scription of protocols in a natural way. Abadi and Gordon
[1] observe that this kind of approach combines a precise
and solid foundation for reasoning about protocols together
with a clear relationship to implementations.
Another benefit of the process algebra approach is to
identify precisely the properties required of a protocol. This
may be left vague in the original formulation of the proto-
col, and performing the verification often gives information
as to which properties actually hold, as well as pinning
down precisely the properties which are provided by the
protocol. The vital question as to whether the properties
obtained are indeed those required are beyond the scope of
the formal analysis itself, and must really be assessed ac-
cording to the intended use of the protocol. Security prop-
erties may be captured as CSP specifications, or alterna-
tively in terms of equivalences between processes, as is
done in [1], where a network built using the protocol is re-
quired to be equivalent to a network which describes the
effect of a correct operation of the protocol: equivalence
means that the protocol must operate correctly: that no
context written in the process algebra can distinguish be-
tween the actual protocol and its specification.
6.1 Comparison with Other Approaches
The CSP approach put forward by this author in [22] advo-
cated the encapsulation of required properties in terms of
the interactions between the protocol agents and their us-
ers. The intention is to separate out the required properties
from the way of implementing them. Since a property of a
system should be described in terms of its possible interac-
tions with its environment, the internal channels trans.i and
rec.i should not appear in the property description. This
approach requires extra events such as A.connect_to.B and
B.authenticated.A to appear in the protocol description as
captured in USERA and USERB. The descriptions might then
be as follows:
USERA = a.connect_to? i 
                   trans.A!i!pi(nA.A) 
                      rec.A.i?pA(nA.x.i) 
                         trans.A!i!pi(x)  Stop
USERB = rec.B.A?pB(y.A) 
                   trans.B!A!pA(y.nB.B) 
                      rec.B?i.pB(nB) 
                          B.authenticated.A  Stop
Our top level requirement would be that
NET \ (trans < rec) sat
A.connect_to.B precedes B.authenticated.A
The essential proof strategy will remain that proposed in
this paper, but the high-level description of the property
will be purely in terms of the interactions between the net-
work and its environment. The proof rules will remain un-
changed, though there will be an additional assumption
required that messages of rank 0 or less are not introduced
to protocol agents by the environment. This was guaran-
teed when such agents had no channels apart from trans
and rec.
The approach of including additional ‘control’ events
into a protocol description is appropriate both for abstract-
ing away the details of the protocol description, and also
for providing a clearer understanding of what the protocol
designer is attempting to achieve. This separation of con-
cerns allows authentication specifications to be formulated
independently of the details of any particular protocol. Ex-
ternal events are introduced in other CSP approaches to
protocol analysis [19], [11] and elsewhere [24]. In the case of
the analysis performed here, additional external events
such as A.nonce_challenge_OK.B might be included to make
finer distinctions between different flavors of authentica-
tion. This approach is simply a straightforward extension of
the approach we have taken in this paper, introducing spe-
cial events to mark particular points in the run of the proto-
col which we have been pinpointing directly.
Another issue of interest is that Definition 3.2 is not con-
cerned with matching up occurrences of events from T and
R: once some event from R has occurred then this definition
allows arbitrarily many events from T to occur without
breaking authentication. Lowe [12] discusses a stronger
version of authentication which requires each authenticat-
ing event to correspond to a different authenticated event—
he terms this requirement “injectivenes.” Such a property is
important in, for example, the authorisation of financial
transactions. This property can be captured by strengthen-
ing the above definition as follows:
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R T
tr R tr T
injectively precedes =
≥
̂
# ( | ) # | )\ \
where # tr denotes the length of the trace tr. The property R
injectively precedes is strictly stronger than R pre-
cedes T.
The techniques developed in this paper are concerned
only with noninjective authentication. Their extension to
deal with injectiveness is an area of ongoing research.
This approach contrasts with that taken in [4], [19] where
specifications are what Roscoe calls intensional, requiring
that the protocol works ‘as expected’ in some sense. Such
properties cannot be expressed as CSP specifications inde-
pendently of the protocol itself, and they really correspond
to a recipe for providing the specification appropriate to the
particular protocol. For example, Gollmann identifies a
number of authentication properties in [6]; the one closest
to those we have considered here is G4, which states that
“the origin of all messages in the protocol has to be authen-
ticated.” Other examples are given in [20], which gives the
‘canonical’ intensional specification as one where the inter-
leavings of events at different agents are in accordance with
the messages in the protocol; and a slightly weaker one in
[4], which requires that whenever a participant completes
its part of a protocol run then the other participant must
have engaged in the sequence of events described by the
protocol. These intensional properties can be formulated for
any particular protocol, but not in CSP terms independently
of any protocol.
A different process algebraic approach is taken by Abadi
and Gordon [1], where the pi-calculus [15] is extended (to
the spi-calculus) to model encryption. The resulting lan-
guage allows protocols to be described in a straightforward
way; the treatment of freshness of nonces and keys is more
explicitly provided by the process description language
itself: encapsulation with the n operator provides a natural
and pleasing model of nonce and key generation. Correct-
ness of a protocol is established by showing that it is testing
equivalent to a specification process that describes explic-
itly what the protocol is intended to achieve. In other
words, they are indistinguishable in any context. As a re-
sult, the enemy does not have to be modeledexplicitly. The
capabilities of the enemy are precisely those that can be
described within the spi-calculus language: a context dis-
tinguishing between protocol and its specification would
describe an attack on the protocol, and conversely if no
context distinguishes them, then the protocol implements
the specification in the context of any enemy which may be
described in the spi calculus. This contrasts with the ap-
proach taken in this paper, where the specification is sepa-
rated to some extent from the protocol, and which allows
finer distinctions to be drawn between different notions of
authentication. The explicit description of the enemy allows
analysis with regard to different enemy capabilities within
the same framework. More comparative examples are re-
quired to explore the relative merits of each approach.
The approach of providing a rank function r as the core
of a proof is complementary to the tool-based approaches
[10], [14], [9], [19] which search for attacks. The results of
the latter kind of analysis provide useful information as to
why a protocol is not correct, or alternatively give a bald
statement that no attack can be found. This is appropriate
for debugging, but does not provide understanding as to
why a protocol is correct. It is a claim of this paper that the
rank function provides the basis for such an understanding,
and it might be profitable to explore the interplay between
the state exploration approaches and proofs. One problem
concerns the relationship between the finite nature of the
state space and the infinite possibilities for attacks (such as
arise from such aspects as the possibility of arbitrary depths
of encryption and combining of messages), and Lowe [11]
has begun to consider a proof strategy based on the general
form of a protocol run for establishing when the absence of
an attack on a finite state space really does imply that no
attack is possible on the infinite state space. It seems that
the rank function approach might also be useful in this
context.
Paulson [18] has investigated the application of the proof
tool Isabelle/HOL to proving security properties of proto-
cols. He specifies security protocols in terms of traces of the
system as a whole. The steps of a protocol are translated
into rules about how system traces may be augmented.
Possible enemy activities also become rules. Once all of the
rules have been identified, the aim is to prove that any sys-
tem trace that can be generated using the rules must meet
the required property; this is established by induction. He
does not use an explicit invariant, but he also aims to prove
that particular events can never occur in a trace, and this
requires certain lemmas establishing that particular classes
of event cannot occur. This is also a feature of the approach
taken in [13], which applies language theory to establish
that particular terms cannot be generated using given pro-
duction rules. Mechanical assistance for proofs is invalu-
able, and Paulson has some useful results concerning reus-
ability of proof strategies. It appears that a number of pro-
tocols have proofs of a similar shape, which allows efficient
analysis of new protocols. Recent work on providing me-
chanical assistance to the CSP proofs using PVS [17] is en-
couraging, but at present1 fit is still necessary to provide the
invariant in order for the proof to proceed, so analysis of
fresh protocols will not be as automatic as Paulson reports
for Isabelle/HOL.
Other approaches to direct proof of protocols, rather
than the indirect route by establishing absence of attacks,
tend to be based on formal languages for describing secu-
rity properties, together with rules which support reason-
ing about statements in the language. Protocols are mod-
eledas rules which allow the derivation of new statements
from existing ones. The best known example of such a lan-
guage is the BAN logic [2], though the need for ‘idealiza-
tion’ of protocols into the logic means that the link between
a protocol and its logical treatment is informal. The formal
language described in [23] contains lower-level primitives
which relate more directly to the steps taken by a protocol,
and supports reasoning concerning the knowledge of the
intruder at particular stages. This language is used in con-
junction with the NRL protocol analyzer which is used to
1. As of April 1998.
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check reachability of negated requirements, so it is closer to
the tool-based approaches. However, an approach to proof
reflecting that presented in this paper seems feasible.
6.2 Future Directions
This paper has presented an approach to analyzing and
verifying authentication protocols, driven in part by con-
sideration of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. The verifi-
cation was done by hand, and the cryptographic mecha-
nisms considered are straightforward: nonces, and public-
key encryption. There is an obvious need to investigate the
CSP handling of other security mechanisms such as time-
stamps, and to investigate more complicated protocols.
Some form of mechanical assistance for proof has now
been provided within PVS [17] by Bruno Dutertre at Royal
Holloway. A CSP trace semantics has been provided for the
operators used in this paper, the various proof rules have
all been proven sound, and all of the theorems have been
proven. Correctness of the protocols in this paper with re-
spect to their various properties has been established. An
important avenue to explore will be the extent to which
construction of the rank function can be assisted. In effect, a
proof can be provided with respect to particular constraints
on the rank function, and the proof is completed once a
function can be provided which meets all those constraints.
APPENDIX
THEOREM 3.5. If
[R1:] " m ¶ INIT  r(m) > 0
[R2:] " S, m  ((" s ¶ S  r(m) > 0) ` S £ m ˘ r(m) > 0)
[R3:] " t ¶ T  r(m)  0
[R4:] " i  (USERi |[R]| Stop sat maintains r)
then NET sat precedes T
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 it is sufficient to establish that R1–R4
imply NET |[R]| Stop sat tr |\  T = kl.
Assume for a contradiction that R1–R4 hold, and
also that À (NET |[R]| Stop sat tr |\T =]l). Then there
is some trace tr ¶ traces(NET |[R] Stop) for which tr |\
T ¡ kl. Since R3 tells us that r(t)  0 for any t ¶ T we
have that there are some messages in tr with rank less
than 1. Let tr0 be the prefix of tr whose final message
is the first message of tr of rank 0 or less. In other
words, tr0 is the trace up to the point where the first
message of rank 0 or less appears. By prefix closure of
traces in processes, tr0 is a trace of NET |[R]| Stop.
Now consider the last message of tr0. It is either of
the form rec.i.j.x or trans.i.j.x for some i, j, and x, where
r(x)  0
Case rec.i.j.x. We have that tr0 is a trace of ENEMY.
Hence by Theorem 3.1 we have that (INIT < (tr0 ˙
trans)) £ tr0 ˙ rec and so (INIT < (tr0 ˙ trans)) £ x. But
by the definition of tr0 we have " m ¶ tr0 ˙ trans 
r(m)  1, since all messages in tr0 apart from the last
have strictly positive rank, so R1 and R2 yield that
r(x)  1, forcing a contradiction.
Case trans.i.x. Let tri = tr0 |\  {trans.i, rec.i}. This is the
subsequence of tr0 in which USERi |[R]} Stop partici-
pates, so tri is a trace of USERi |[R]| Stop. Hence, by
R4 we have maintains ρ(tri). Expanding the defini-
tion we find
(" m ¶ tri ˙ rec.i  r(m)  1)
       ˙ (" m ¶ tri ˙ trans.i  r(m)  1)
The definition of tr0 means that the antecedent of
this implication is true, from which it follows that r(x)
 1, yielding a contradiction.
In either case we find a contradiction, which estab-
lishes the theorem. o
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